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Abstract 
This study examines whether former Andersen clients report more conservative earnings compared to other Big4 clients in the 
immediate year after an audit switch. In this study, we hypothesize that successor auditors would demand for more conservative 
reporting as they perceived former Anderson clients has unique audit and litigation risks. We measure conservative reporting 
based on the asymmetric recognition speed of good news and bad news on earnings. Our results conclude that successor auditors 
demand for more conservative financial reporting when auditing former Andersen client, hence contributing new evidence from 
an emerging market. 
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1. Introduction 
Conservative reporting practices have been viewed as a preferred quality of financial reports (Bernstein and 
Siegel, 1979; Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper, 2004; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Conservatism promotes 
downward bias of earnings and assets, hence plays important roles in monitoring firm managers and reducing agency 
cost between managers and shareholders, and between shareholders and other debt holders. Watts (2003) explains 
that conservatism has evolved in response to demands of contracting, taxation, and regulation. He defines 
conservatism as ‘the asymmetric verification requirements for gains and losses’, i.e. higher standard is used in the 
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recognition of gains compared to losses. As stricter accounting requirement is needed in the recognition of gains, 
managers are less likely to overstate earnings. This in turn reduces the probability of expropriation of shareholders’ 
resources by managers and prevents excessive distribution of resources to shareholders at the expense of debt 
holders (Khan and Watts, 2009). 
In the context of Andersen failure, several studies have examined conservative reporting issues in the United 
States, where the Enron and Andersen problems originated. Using the accruals model, Cahan and Zhang (2006) find 
that former Andersen clients (Ex-Andersen) had lower levels of and larger decreases in abnormal accruals in 2002, 
suggesting that the successor auditors assessed an Andersen audit as a unique source of litigation risk. Another study 
by Krishnan (2007) finds that conservative reporting of earnings had increased for former Andersen clients that 
switched to a Big4 auditor. This result shows that auditors are aware on the risk associated with the new client. In 
this study, new evidence from a non-US market is offered. Using a sample of publicly listed companies in an 
emerging market, Malaysia, this study finds that Ex-Andersen clients report more conservative earnings compared to 
other Big4 clients during the year after an audit switch. The results from the asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
model, developed by Basu (1997), show that former Andersen clients had higher asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
in a year after switching compared to the control group. High level of conservatism in Ex-Andersen clients supports 
the notion that a successor auditor are more conservative, resulting in higher quality of financial reporting. This 
implies that successor auditors demand for more conservative financial reporting when auditing former Andersen 
client, even in an emerging market. The findings provide insight that non-US based auditors also perceived high 
audit risks when auditing former Andersen clients.  
This paper contributes new evidence to the accounting and auditing literatures, specifically on the relationship 
between auditing and financial reporting quality. This study complements Cahan and Zhang (2006) and Krishnan 
(2007) who examine auditor conservatism in the US. While they found that auditor conservatism leads to higher 
conservatism following the switch, they are unable to generalize their findings to emerging market. Evidence 
provided in this study, based on non-US market suggests that the successor auditors also perceived former Andersen 
clients as a unique source of risk. In addition, this study supports a view that auditor switch has a positive impact on 
financial reporting quality.  
2. Hypotheses Development 
The effect of auditor switching, especially in the early years of the audit engagement, on earnings quality is 
subject to considerable debates. On one side, the opponents of mandatory audit rotation put forward several 
arguments supporting the notion that auditor switching leads to low quality audit. First, auditors require longer time 
to accumulate client-specific knowledge which assists the assessment of audit risks (Arrunada and Paz-Ares, 1997). 
Auditors who conducted an audit for the same client over a number of years will learn successively about critical 
accounting issues that may require particular attention (Gul, Fung and Jaggi, 2009). Second, the switch of auditors 
might be a result from resignation of auditors due to high risk of the client. The clients may also switch auditor after 
receiving qualified opinion, consistent with the auditor-switching and opinion-shopping literature (for e.g. DeFond 
and Subramanyam, 1998; Krishnan, 1994; Lennox, 2000). These exposed newly-appointed auditors to lower quality 
of reporting by clients. St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) argued that audit firms are relatively more likely to make 
mistakes in the early years of their tenure. Similarly, after reviewing 406 cases of alleged audit failure, an AICPA 
quality control committee concluded that allegations of audit failure occur three times more often during the first two 
years of the audit engagement than in subsequent years (AICPA, 1992). 
However, in the case of Arthur Andersen, a study by Cahan and Zhang (2006) finds that Ex-Andersen clients had 
lower levels of and larger decreases in abnormal accruals in 2002, suggesting that the successor auditors assessed an 
Andersen audit as a unique source of litigation risk. In addition, Krishnan (2007) finds that conservative reporting of 
earnings has increased for former Andersen clients that switched to a Big4 auditor. This result shows that auditors 
are aware on the risk associated with the new client and give high incentives to auditors to demand for income-
reducing accounting choices (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998). The newly appointed auditors, hence would have 
strong incentives to find and correct any misstatements contained in new client financial statements. In addition, 
newly appointed auditors have strong position to demand more conservative accounting from clients. Following an 
audit failure, the auditor will enforce policies more actively which restrain management’s ability to report aggressive 
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accounting earnings. This is consistent with the arguments by St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) that enforcing more 
conservative accounting choices would reduce the risk of audit failures as the probability of the lawsuits against 
auditors is related to aggressive earnings. Following the above arguments, it is hypothesized that: 
H1: Former clients of Arthur Andersen in Malaysia report more conservative earnings 
compared to other Big4 clients, following the audit switch. 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Sample and Data Collection 
The sample of this study is restricted to the year 2003, where all firms audited by Arthur Andersen were forced to 
switch to the new auditors following the demise of Arthur Andersen. This paper also limits the sample to Big4 firms 
to control for differential audit quality. The firms in financial sector are also excluded due to their unique nature of 
business and financial reporting practices. The data were collected from several sources. Market data were collected 
from the Datastream database, while accounting data were downloaded from the Worldscope database. The data on 
audit switching were directly collected from companies’ corporate annual report. The final sample consists of 76 
former Andersen clients and 215 other Big4 clients. Table 1 shows the definition of variables used in this study.  
 
Table 1. Variable description and sources of data 
  
Symbol Definition Source of data 
E Earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the period. Worldscope 
RET Annual rate of return for the period Worldscope 
RD A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is bad news (when the return is negative or 
zero); 0 if there is good news (positive return) 
Worldscope 
ANDERSEN A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is a former client of Arthur Andersen, 
and 0 for other Big4 clients 
Annual report 
Industry Industry dummies Bursa Malaysia 
 
To limit the influence of extreme observations, the top and bottom 1% of the distribution of returns (RET) and 
earnings per price (E/P) were winsorized. 
3.2. Model Specifications 
Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings model is employed as a measure for conservative reporting. 
This model measures the response of earnings towards the information captured by the market. Basu (1997) 
incorporates interaction variables, i.e. good news and bad news, with an argument that conservative accounting 
induces asymmetry in earnings timeliness. The model is stated below.  
Eit = α0 + β1RETit + β2RDit + β3RETit*RDit + εit (1) 
where:  
Eit is earnings before extraordinary items per market value of equity at the beginning of the period, RETit is the 
buy and hold return starting 3 months after the end of the fiscal year t-j-1 and ending 3 months after the end of year, 
and RDit takes value 1 when RET is negative, and 0 otherwise.  
In this model, annual stock return (RET) is a proxy for economic income, which immediately captures all 
available information arriving in the market. Accounting earnings (E) however, require a higher degree of 
verification to recognise good news compared to bad news. Good news related to an increase of future cash inflow 
of the firm, is only recognised when it meets recognition criteria as prescribed in accounting standards; otherwise 
the recognition will be delayed. While for the bad news, accounting earnings (E) recognise the losses in a timely 
manner where sufficient provision was provided. This situation creates bias or asymmetric timeliness of earnings.  
To test the difference of timeliness of earnings between bad news sample and good news sample, Basu (1997) 
introduces a dummy variable (RD) and incorporates an interaction variable (RET*RD). In the equation (1), the 
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coefficient of RET*RD (β3) tests the difference coefficients for RET between a good news and a bad news sample. 
A positive and significant coefficient of RET*RD (β3) indicates that the sample recognizes bad news faster than 
good news, and a higher coefficient value of RET*RD denotes a higher level of conservatism. 
This study aims to examine differences in levels of conservative reporting of earnings between former clients of 
Arthur Andersen and other Big4 clients. A dummy variable,  ANDERSEN,is used, which takes value 1 if the 
observation is a former client of Arthur Andersen, and 0 for other Big4 clients and then calculated three interaction 
variables for ANDERSEN with RET, RD, and RET*RD, as stated in equation (2).  
Eit = α0 + β1RETit + β2RDit + β3RETit*RDit + β4ANDERSENit + β5RETit*ANDERSENit 
 + β6RDit*ANDERSENit + β7RETit*RDit*ANDERSENit + εit         (2) 
For equation (2), the coefficient for RETit*RDit*ANDERSENit, β7, measures differences of β3 (asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings) between former clients of Arthur Andersen and other Big4 clients. 
4. Findings 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for Ex-Andersen and control sample. From the table, there is no 
significant difference in earnings yield (E), stock returns (RET), firm size (SIZE), and leverage (RISK) between the 
two samples. In term of growth (MTB), Ex-Andersen sample is significantly smaller (p<0.10) compared to control 
sample.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Ex-Andersen Other Big4 Difference 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Diff. t-stats 
E 0.027 0.294 0.042 0.280 0.019 1.518 
RET 0.149 0.532 0.167 0.832 0.018 0.782 
SIZE 8.460 0.538 8.545 0.586 0.085 1.593 
RISK 0.410 0.196 0.396 0.212 -0.014 -1.604 
MTB 0.921 0.650 1.027 0.856 0.056*** 1.809 
Significance is based on two-tailed tests. */**/*** represents significance at 1/5/10% level. The sample consists of 76 former Andersen clients 
and 215 other Big4 clients from the year 2003.  
 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix. It is observed that the highest pair wise correlation is 0.431 that is between 
earnings yield and stock returns. Market to book ratio and stock returns are significantly correlated at 0.399. Other 
variables are correlated at not more than 0.300. Based on these results, all the pair wise correlations between the 
variables are relatively low and well below the 0.80 threshold that could cause serious multi-collinearity problems. 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
 
Variable E RET SIZE RISK MTB 
E 0.257* 0.156* -0.236* 0.106* 
RET 0.431* 0.055* -0.032** 0.319* 
SIZE 0.224* 0.155* 0.194* 0.080* 
RISK -0.155* -0.072* 0.208* 0.041** 
MTB 0.147* 0.399* 0.037 -0.024 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively.  
4.2. Assessment of Conservatism after the Switching of Auditors of Ex-Andersen Clients  
This study examines whether Ex-Andersen clients report more conservative earnings compared to other Big4 
clients during the year after an audit switch. It is estimated that the Basu (1997) reverse earnings-return regression, 
equation (1), on three samples: (i) Ex-Andersen sample, (ii) other Big4 sample, and (iii) pooled sample. The pooled 
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sample was used to test differences in conservative reporting between former clients of Arthur Andersen and other 
Big4 clients.  
Equation (1) is estimated to 76 Ex-Andersen clients and 215 other Big4 clients. The regression estimates in 
column 1 and 2 show that the level of conservative reporting of earnings is higher in Ex-Andersen clients than other 
Big4 clients. The coefficient for RET*RD in Ex-Andersen clients is 1.298 while other Big4 clients have a 
coefficient of 0.326.   
 
Table 4. Switching of Ex-Andersen clients and other Big4 
 
Sample  Ex-Andersen  Other Big4  Pooled 
Statistics  Coeff white-t  Coeff white-t  Coeff white-t 
Intercept  0.044 (0.816)  0.063*** (1.915)  0.063*** (1.909) 
RET  0.064 (0.861)  0.040 (1.236)  0.040 (1.233) 
RD  0.192 (1.526)  0.037 (0.641)  0.037 (0.639) 
RET*RD  1.298* (3.159)  0.326** (2.245)  0.326** (2.239) 
ANDERSEN      -0.019 (-0.301) 
ANDERSEN*RET      0.024 (0.293) 
ANDERSEN*RD      0.156 (1.131) 
ANDERSEN*RET*RD      0.973** (2.247) 
Industry dummies  included   included   included  
F-stat  6.523  4.567   4.888 
Adj. R2  0.18  0.05   0.09 
N  76  215   291 
The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% 
(*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per sharedeflated by share price at the beginning of the 
period for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; 
RDit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; ANDERSEN is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation 
is a former client of Arthur Andersen, and 0 for other Big4 clients; Industryare dummy variables for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; and εit is the 
error term. 
 
The regression estimates for equation (2) for pooled sample are reported in column 3. The coefficient for 
RET*RD is 3.294 and significant at 1% level, showing evidence of conservative reporting of earnings in other Big4 
clients. The coefficient for ANDERSEN*RET*RD is 0.973 and significant at 5% level, suggesting that the level of 
conservative reporting in Ex-Andersen clients is significant higher compared to clients of other Big4 firms. These 
results imply that auditor who audited Ex-Andersen clients force greater conservative reporting compared to other 
Big4 auditors, consistent with Cahan and Zhang (2006)’s suggestion that the Andersen-Enron affair could have 
increased litigation risk for the successor auditor in at least two ways. First, Cahan and Zhang (2006) argue that if 
the real audit quality of Andersen was low (for instance, if Andersen's audit procedures are systematically weaker 
than the Big 4), then the potential for misstatements in the financial statements of former clients would increase. 
Second, Cahan and Zhang (2006) state that if the perceived audit quality of Andersen is low (for example, if 
investors revise downward their beliefs about Andersen's ability to detect and report misstatements), investors 
wouldput more effort to scrutinize the financial statements. Given the increased litigation risk for the successor 
auditor of Ex-Anderson clients, conservative reporting would be a desirable and preferable choice. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
This study examines whether Ex-Andersen clients report more conservative earnings compared to other Big4 
clients during the year after an audit switch. Using a sample of publicly listed companies in an emerging market, 
Malaysia, this study finds that the level of conservative reporting in Ex-Andersen clients in the year after switching 
to a new auditor compared to clients of other Big4 firms were significantly higher. The results indicate that 
successor auditors demand for more conservative financial reporting when auditing former Andersen clients. This is 
consistent with Cahan and Zhang (2006), who examined the US sample. This study is relevant for financial 
statement users including the investors and investment analyst in evaluating the quality of information presented in 
the financial statements. The study also supplies input for the policy makers on financial reporting and audit quality 
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after the demise of Andersen, which is relevant when considering policy on mandatory audit rotation. The findings 
provide insight that non-US based auditors also perceived high audit risks when auditing former Andersen clients. 
High level of conservatism in these firms also supports the argument that a successor auditor are more conservative, 
resulting in higher quality of financial reporting. While most of the prior studies focusing on developed market, this 
study contributes new evidence from an emerging market. It is suggested for future research to assess the 
implication regulations and any new audit requirements on the financial reporting quality. 
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